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British psychologists such as Hans Eysenck and Jeffrey Gray have been giants in 
the field of individual differences, offering psychobiological accounts of major 
personality traits such as extraversion (E) and neuroticism (N), as well as the 
cluster of impulsive antisocial sensation seeking (ImpASS) personality facets, 
marked by Eysenck's psychoticism (P) scale. These theories have stimulated 
vibrant research programmes worldwide, including several within British 
psychology departments. This article provides a snapshot of classic and 
contemporary British research into the affective, behavioural and cognitive 
processes which characterise personality. 
 
 
2.1. The personality theories of Eysenck and Gray  
 
Individual differences research can justifiably claim to have played a central role in the 
history of British psychology, as the first article, by Matthews and Petrides, in this issue 
illustrates. Especially in Britain, the area of personality has been dominated by the 
contributions of two of the most prolific and well-cited psychologists in the world, Hans 
Eysenck and Jeffrey Gray. These giants in the field approached personality from distinct 
starting points but left a related legacy with their coherent and testable frameworks for 
understanding the biological bases of major personality dimensions (see Nyborg, 1997, and 
Corr, 2008, for perspectives on their work). In this article we take a look at contemporary 
British research that builds upon their legacy. We shall adopt Eysenck’s tripartite division of 
personality (the ‘giant three’ model) as our launching point: extraversion (E), neuroticism (N) 
and psychoticism (P). We list the facets contributing to each of these dimensions in Box 1. It 
should be noted that this choice does not reflect some Anglocentric bias against the Big Five 
model (McCrae & Costa, 2003) that originated in the US. It simply reflects our view, and that 
of Eysenck (1992) and Gray, that there is much in common between the two frameworks. 
Specifically, high P scores equate to a combination of low conscientiousness and low 
agreeableness. 
 
 
1.2. Extraversion (E)  
 
In contrast to European and American traditions, the work of Eysenck and Gray was notable 
for providing a framework that went beyond mere description, towards an explanation of the 
causal bases of personality and individual differences. Eysenck (1967) proposed that E was 
related to differences in thresholds for arousal in the ascending reticular activating system. 
This led to testable predictions about the behaviour and cognition of introverts and extraverts 
under differing levels of arousal. These predictions have met with mixed experimental 
success (Matthews & Gilliland, 1999), but still provide a framework for current findings. For 
example, Smillie and Gökçen (2010) recently examined whether the effects of caffeine on 
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working memory performance, as assessed with the widely-used n-back task, differed 
between those who self-reported their E as high and those who reported it as low. They found 
that caffeine facilitated performance under high, but not low, working memory load 
conditions, and only for participants who were highly extraverted. This followed an earlier 
fMRI study, also using the n-back task, which found that higher scores on a self-report 
measure of E, but not N and P, were associated with increasing levels of activation in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate as working memory load increased 
(Kumari, Ffytche, Williams & Gray, 2004). Findings such as these highlight both the role that 
E plays in modulating basic cognitive processes, and the general robustness of Eysenck’s 
causal approach.  
 
Gray developed a related framework (involving the Behavioural Approach System; 
Pickering & Gray, 1999), which suggests that variation in dopamine (DA) pathway 
functioning underpins a major dimension of personality. A widespread view is that this 
dimension may be E (e.g. Depue & Collins, 1999). Indeed, recent British work supports this 
idea. One of the roles DA plays in reward-mediated behaviour is signalling that a reward is 
better or worse than expected (via a reward prediction error; RPE). RPE has been shown to 
modulate an event-related potential (ERP) occurring 200-300 msecs after motivationally 
salient stimuli. A negative deflection in this time frame has been referred to as feedback-
related negativity (FRN). Smillie, Cooper and Pickering (2011) found, using an associative 
learning task, that the FRN in response to an unpredicted reward and to an unexpected non-
reward differed between high and low extraverts; specifically, the FRN was more negative 
after an unpredicted non-reward, and less negative following an unpredicted reward, for the 
high extraverts when compared with the low extraverts. An earlier study by the same group 
(Smillie, Cooper, Proitsi, Powell & Pickering, 2010) had also found that those with at least 
one copy of the A1 allele on the DRD2 gene (a gene influencing the functioning of DA 
receptors) had significantly higher self-reported E scores than those without a copy of this 
allele. These findings highlight the substantive and on-going role that Gray’s work has played 
in our understanding of the biological bases of E.  
 
 
2.3  Neuroticism (N)  
 
Neuroticism, or low emotional stability, is one of the most robust personality factors seen in 
all virtually descriptive models of personality (Zuckerman, 2005). This is not surprising 
because, following Eysenck’s lead, most personality models adopt the personality-
psychopathology continuity model of mental illness. This assumption motivated Eysenck’s 
(1944) factor analysis of a medical checklist given to neurotic military draftees during World 
War 2. The soldiers had not experienced the trauma of battle; instead, their ‘breakdowns’ 
were in response to being away from home and undergoing basic military training. In 
addition to a bipolar hysteria (extraversion) and dysthymia (introversion) factor, Eysenck 
discerned a second dimension that reflected the degree of disturbance, namely, N. For the rest 
of his life, Eysenck worked on statistically refining his measure of neuroticism, seeking to 
explain it in terms of neurophysiological processes, initially (1957) in terms of Pavlovian 
excitatory and inhibitory processes and later (1967) in terms of limbic activation. Eysenck’s 
neurophysiological speculations were never entirely satisfactory, but at the very least 
stimulated work towards clarification. 
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It fell to Eysenck’s student, Jeffrey Gray, to propose a more viable model of 
Neuroticism. Gray (1981) was able to point to fundamental flaws in Eysenck’s theory; his 
alternative account today forms the highly influential reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST) 
of personality. In its original form, Gray (1970) proposed that a major dimension of 
personality (anxiety) reflected an individual’s sensitivity to punishment. Gray argued that this 
dimension comprised approximately two parts N plus one part introversion. This original 
suggestion spawned a plethora of research, starting with a trickle of studies in the 1970s, 
leading to a flood in the 2000s (for a summary, see Corr, 2008).  
 
The most recent version of RST (Corr & McNaughton, 2008) proposes that one’s 
level of N reflects sensitivity to punishment and threat in general. However, within N, there 
are two traits/emotions, each of which maps on to one of the two major systems for defensive 
behaviour. Fear and trait fearfulness arise from the functioning of the fight-flight-freeze 
system (FFFS), which is responsible for mediating reactions to all aversive stimuli (e.g. 
punishment, nonreward and frustration), and is involved in active avoidance and escape 
behaviour. At the extreme end of the continuum, this system (and personality trait) maps onto 
clinical conditions such as phobia, panic, and OCD. Anxiety arises from variations in the 
sensitivity of the behavioural inhibition system (BIS), which is responsible for detecting and 
resolving goal conflict, especially between FFFS-related aversive motivation and approach-
related appetitive motivation. The BIS is involved in cautious behaviours in potentially 
dangerous situations (i.e. passive avoidance) and, once activated, it generates risk assessment 
behaviour, rumination and increased arousal. These aspects, in their more extreme form, map 
onto anxiety disorders and explain many of their salient features (worry, rumination, 
anticipation of negative events).  
 
Recent research supports Gray’s model. For example, there is psychometric support 
for the separation of fear and anxiety, as revised RST demands (Cooper, Perkins & Corr, 
2007). Perkins, Ettinger, Davis, Foster, Williams & Corr (2009) showed that an anti-anxiety 
drug (lorazepam), given to healthy volunteers, reduced a human behavioural analogue of 
rodent risk assessment behaviour, whereas a drug used to treat panic disorders (citalopram) 
had no effect on this behaviour. These results are in line with the revised RST as risk 
assessment is a product of the anxiety system (the BIS) specifically, rather than the fear 
system (the FFFS). In a subsequent study (Perkins, Ettinger, Williams, Reuter, Hennig & 
Corr, 2011), the same laboratory measure of flight intensity, in 200 healthy participants, was 
significantly correlated with a standard questionnaire measuring fear of tissue damage to 
one’s body; and Spielberger’s state anxiety measure was unrelated to flight intensity, as 
predicted by RST. DNA was taken from these participants and genotyped for a single 
nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) within the serotonin 2a receptor gene (HTR2A) on 
chromosome 13. This candidate gene was selected because the C allele in this SNP is known 
to be associated with increased susceptibility to pure (but not co-morbid) panic disorder (see 
Perkins et al., 2009). Carriers of the C allele (vs. non carriers) showed significantly higher 
levels of flight intensity. Once again, revised RST, which associates panic disorder with 
extreme sensitivity of the FFFS, is supported by these data. 
 
 
2.4. Psychoticism (P)  
First, we must deal with Eysenck’s unfortunate choice of name for this scale, reflecting his 
belief that psychoticism reflected a disposition towards psychotic illness (“psychosis-
proneness”; Eysenck, 1992). High scorers on the P scale, however, do not have a significantly 
elevated risk of schizophrenia (Chapman, Chapman & Kwapil, 1994) nor do schizophrenic 
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patients score highly on scales containing many P items (Cochrane, Petch & Pickering, 
2010). We prefer, along with the likes of Zuckerman (1993), to view P as a marker of a 
cluster of traits we call Impulsive Antisocial Sensation Seeking (ImpASS; Pickering, 2004). 
The clinical analogue of those who score highly on the P scale is not 
schizophrenia/psychosis, but rather psychopathy (Corr, 2010) or, more broadly, cluster B 
personality disorders (i.e. antisocial, borderline, narcissistic). Gray also said relatively little 
about the P scale, although he did publish papers in which P was used as a marker of 
psychosis-proneness (e.g. Baruch, Hemsley & Gray, 1988). Perhaps because of the lack of a 
sound theoretical steer from Eysenck and Gray, there has been a relative dearth of work 
attempting to pin down the psychobiological features of healthy people with high ImpASS 
(high P) scores (especially in the cognitive domain).  
 
However, Corr (2010) has recently reviewed the small body of work on P and 
cognition and concluded that the studies point to specific attentional control problems in 
those with high P scores, emphasizing their difficulties with tasks requiring attentional 
flexibility. Recent studies have extended this idea by showing that individuals with high P 
scores were inflexible in adjusting their focus of attention during an experiment investigating 
“task-switching” in which the instructions about which stimulus to attend to were suddenly 
changed (Tharp & Pickering, 2011). High P participants were, however, impaired only after 
one kind of attentional cue shift condition (called “perseveration”). After the switch in the 
perseveration condition, the previous attentional targets (e.g. green stimuli) had to be ignored 
while the new targets of attention (e.g. blue stimuli) were the focus of attention. High P 
participants were unimpaired by attentional switches in the so-called “learned irrelevance” 
condition: here, a previously ignored stimulus type (e.g. white stimuli) became the new 
attentional target after the switch, and the stimulus type (e.g. red stimuli) to be ignored was 
novel thereby removing any perseveration effects. The effect of P was dissociated from the 
effects of other variables in the study, including working memory (WM) capacity; those with 
high WM capacity were better able to cope with task switches in both switch conditions, 
relative to those with low WM capacity.  
 
Problems with cognitive flexibility in high P individuals may extend outside the 
strictly attentional domain: Smillie, Cooper, Tharp and Pelling (2009) found that high P 
individuals were inflexible when learning from feedback during a category learning task in 
which the rules concerning which stimulus was the correct choice were changed without 
warning (e.g. from blue stimuli to stimuli on the left of the display, etc.). Once again, in this 
study, the effects of P were found to be statistically independent of WM; individuals with 
high WM capacity were better able to cope with category rule switches than individuals with 
low WM capacity. The category learning task used in the study was modelled closely on the 
Wisconsin card-sorting task (WCST), which has for many years been widely used in 
neuropsychological research and practice to measure perseverative (i.e. inflexible) tendencies 
in patients with frontal lobe damage. As the WCST shows activation of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex in neuroimaging studies (see Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000), these findings may 
suggest that the cognitive inflexibility of high P individuals could derive from the operating 
characteristics of their prefrontal brain regions.  
 
2.5. Summary 
 
This brief overview shows that research into the psychobiological substrates of basic 
personality dimensions is currently flourishing in Britain and elsewhere. Moreover, the 
theoretical frameworks of the two giants who kick-started this area of inquiry are still 
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strongly shaping much of the research agenda, albeit that modern technologies (such as 
neuroimaging and DNA genotyping) are now being recruited to help with the quest. 
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